This definition makes planning a kind of rational act seemingly outside the reach of religious prophecy or sentiment, emotional attachment or intuition, and other sources of judgment considered irrational or non-rational. Much planning theory takes this distinction for granted as analysts offer competing conceptions of rationality (e.g. instrumental versus substantive). The emphasis on rationality, however, generates a separation between thought and other kinds of human activity. Theory tells us how to think about planning, but not how to do it. Rational theory discerns the truth, but not what to do with it. Furthermore, the association with rationality holds planning hostage to these debates about rationality.
This essay turns this approach inside out. Instead of arguing how rationality shapes planning, the argument describes how planning shapes rationality. In a nutshell the argument goes something like the following: as humans we make plans to anticipate future events and coordinate actions as a matter of inescapable habit. We communicate our plans to others and in so doing coordinate conduct about and towards our respective goals. We conduct deliberations together and in so doing our plans help turn desires into intentions; intentions we can also use to construct a rationale for what we do. 2 Instead of modeling plans on rational belief, we use plans to organize rational intentions.
This argument focuses on practical rather than theoretical reasoning. 3 I first describe the argument made by philosopher Michael Bratman that plans anticipate and coordinate future activity with others and so make practical reason possible. Bratman shows how what I call small 'p' planning plays a crucial role in how we form intentions that combine both evaluation and belief. 4 I chose Bratman because among the many philosophers studying practical reason, he placed planning at the center of his own inquiry. The ideas of other philosophers offer similar insight, and I draw upon some of their distinctions in footnotes.
Next I turn to what I call the capital 'P' planning. This is planning that we use to cope with urban complexity. I argue that efforts to handle this complexity often use a rationality stripped of intentionality. This can work for periodic and specialized activity (e.g. programmed manufacturing), but not for activities formed by antagonistic, overlapping or ambiguous interaction (e.g. most urban planning problems). Planning for complex urban territories combines knowledge about urban complexity and knowledge about how to turn complex goals into practical judgments. How do we form joint intentions across social, political, cultural and economic divides that enable us to discover and invent ways to coordinate future actions in a specific urban context? How do we make urban plans?
I use the work of two planning analysts to answer this question: Lew Hopkins and Judith Innes. Hopkins studies the methods and practice people use to make plans, as well as the plans themselves. His research contributes to the understanding of urban development ideas that analysts classify as substantive. Hopkins envisions plans as representations of future order that inform decisions. He analyzes plans as symbolic products. Innes studies a variety of purposeful collaborations that people use to anticipate and tame complex public policy issues, what analysts classify as process. Innes envisions plans as Planning Theory 6(1) 18 agreements about future action that inspire commitment. She analyzes the making of plans as part of a deliberative process. Hopkins interprets how urban plans work and Innes how we work with plans. I argue that both viewpoints can prove complementary in the study of plan-making. There need be no epistemic or theoretical gap separating the making and use of plans; no big difference between substance and process. The differences are practical.
The argument in this essay does not discredit debates over theory, but implies that the outcome of such debates may not be important for how we do planning -but mainly affect our beliefs about important social purposes and methodological technique. This shift provides a strong rationale for the value of historical and other types of case study research in addition to more conventional tools of analysis. We learn to improve how well we anticipate and cope with complex problems -whether making plans or planning -comparing how others cope in very specific contexts with similar problems. The context might include the analysis of probabilities for sample data, but it may also include relevant interpretations of a problem using prior experience and case comparison. Additionally, the research allows for the inclusion of the full range of human emotional responses and values. When we get contextual and relevant, the details of narrative, dialog, and the full complement of human interaction provide useful insights about the meaning of the plan and the motivation of the planners.
Planning and practical reason
Philosopher Michael Bratman describes practical rationality using the concept of planning. He confidently presumes what planning theorists and analysts often debate: plans are rational. People possess 'two central capacities. We have the capacity to act purposively; and we have the capacity to form and execute plans' (Bratman, 1987: 2) . Other animal species act purposefully, but none plan. 5 Planning grows out of the cognitive powers of our species that enable us to attend to time and others as we conduct our journey.
We humans make plans because we can reflect before we act. Behavior describes what we do; action describes behavior done according to plan. We anticipate future action in light of our plan, and coordinate our action in relation to the plans of others.
We facilitate coordination in part by constructing larger plans for the future, plans that help coordinate both our own activities over time and our activities with the activities of others. And by settling now on a plan for later I enable my present deliberation to influence my later conduct; I thereby extend the influence of my deliberation beyond the present moment. (Bratman, 1987: 3) We do not make deterministic or complete plans, but provisional ones that we routinely adjust in response to unexpected obstacles in our path or changes in other plans that conflict with our own. 6 We also form habits that turn what were once planned decisions into a predictable routine. When I no longer need to make a plan to coordinate with another I need only follow the routine. When we settle a plan and make a commitment to following it in a predictable context then the decision no longer receives attention, until there is a problem and the routine is broken. 7 Bratman constructs an argument for human intentionality based on this conception of planning rather than the more conventional philosophical models linking practical action to some combination of desire and belief. He asks, 'Why do we bother forming intentions concerning our future? Why don't we just cross our bridges when we come to them?' He concludes that we form intentions as part of plans. Intentions are the building blocks for such plans and so plans may end up becoming intentions projected on a larger scale (Bratman, 1987: 8) . Instead of plans articulating preferences already formed by an instrumental rationality linking individual belief and desire (e.g. utility), for Bratman plans turn desires into intentions that anticipate and so include future consequences and relations. 8 How do we as such limited creatures use practical rationality to anticipate and assess the consequences of our actions? Answering this question leads Bratman to the work of Herbert Simon. We face resource limitations and coordination difficulties in our relationships with others. Time and money are limited as we pursue our future. Coordination also requires that we know what others intend (Bratman, 1987: 9-10) and so anticipates communication with others. We do not form intentions individually on our own, but with others tied to us through specific social and cultural memberships. When Seymour Mandelbaum (2000) describes the constellation of drivers coordinating travel on an expressway as a community he refers to the joint intentionality that informs rational driving in these circumstances. 9
Intentions and practical reasoning
Philosophers studying practical reason often argue that the intentions we hold to do something (I plan to go home at 5:00 pm) flow from a combination of belief (the trip home is good for me) and desire (I want to go home). Bratman (p. 22) takes a different tack, arguing that intentions are not derivative, but on a par with belief and desire. All share the following characteristics: they control conduct because they fuel anticipation rather than describe capacity. We do not possess desires, beliefs and intentions in a contemplative or passive fashion. They only make sense in relationship to what we do. Each resists reconsiderationoffering a kind of human inertia. 10 Finally, they serve as input for further practical reasoning: 'It is by providing these reasons for action that intentions provide considerations that are directly relevant to the rationality of the conclusions of means-end reasoning ' (p. 24) . When I choose to take the freeway home it is my intention that makes my choice to enter at the 'A' street on-ramp a rational choice. Intention makes practical decision rational because planned. I want to get home fast. I reflect on alternative routes and consider the likely speed of each, as well as other relevant conditions (weather, rush hour) that I do not control. The route I select becomes the plan that informs my intention to take it. When I coordinate my schedule with yours to set a joint meeting time and place we rely upon plans to tie our desires together into a joint intention.
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Plans and practical reasoning
As we seek to coordinate our conduct with others we do not deliberate about what to do from moment to moment, but use plans to guide our choices. 11 The plans provide scaffolding for joint coordination. We each form our partial plan and then follow it jointly until we encounter problems. 12 For Bratman having a plan means making an appropriate commitment to carrying out the plan. In this sense, then, plans 'are intentions writ large ' (p. 29) . Like intentions, plans control conduct, resist reconsideration and provide inputs for further practical reasoning. 'But because of their increased complexity (as compared with relatively simple intentions) plans reveal other properties that are crucial to an understanding of reasoning-centered commitment. In particular, the plans characteristic of limited agents like us typically have two important features' (p. 29); they are partial and hierarchical.
Our plans are partial. We make plans without filling in all the possible details -leaving room for revision or just doing what we can do given our cognitive limitations. Additionally, our plans typically have a hierarchical structure. Some aspects are more important than others. The incomplete and ordered plans turn intentions into action.
Plans concerning ends embed plans concerning means and preliminary steps; and more general intention (for example, my intention to go to a concert tonight) embed more specific ones (for example, my intention to hear the Alma Trio). As a result, I may deliberate about parts of my plan while holding other parts fixed. I may hold fixed certain intended ends, while deliberating about means or preliminary steps; and I may hold fixed a more general intention, while deliberating about how more specifically to realize it. (p. 29) Using partial, hierarchically organized plans has a pragmatic rationale. Purposeful action by creatures with our peculiar design makes us natural planners. The complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity of our social world make unilateral versus joint planning too rigid. The incomplete and hierarchical format of our planning enables us to cope with a changing world and social partners with diverse goals. We use planning to guide our daily conduct, but also to set and fill in the larger and more general plans for our future and that of others with whom we associate.
We often use the concept rationality to describe how we fit together actions and desires, values and expectations, utilities and probabilities and the like. Plans intervene in this relationship providing a partial and stable coordination. Bratman describes routine or non-deliberative plans that we follow -filling in the contours as we journey without much reflection. But if we run into difficulty or opportunity that breaks this habitual continuity then we may revise our plan or once again continue to put it into effect. Bratman suggests that when we deliberate about our plans we act rationally, but that the more routine planfollowing is reasonable as well. The two overlap along a continuum from routine to exceptional. 13
Stability, confidence and commitment in planning
The stability of plans draws upon my disposition and sensitivity to the relationship between context and expectations. How do we judge when stability is reasonable (prudent? not too much or not too little; justifiable in relation to the plan intent)? Bratman considers stability in relation to efficacy, how well it works to meet my purpose. My disposition to accept the plan depends on the kind of plan, the specific circumstances and my own peculiar psychological qualities. 'A conception of rational deliberative decision can be expected to cite a central goal in terms of which such decisions are to be assessed. Given such a goal we may proceed to assess plan stability in a similarly consequentialist vein' (p. 24).
We do not deliberate from a blank slate, but in the context of predispositions tied to earlier plans, the taken-for-granted plans we follow all the time. How do we describe the reasonableness of such plans? We envision taken-for-granted plan-following as the execution of deliberate decisions that meet the consistency and coherence tests without encountering disruptive problems. We recognize that people follow reasonable plans that might be revised in light of different goals offering more advantageous outcomes. Changing plans has costs that may not balance reconsideration and redirection. The less stable my current plans, the more susceptible they become to distraction based on new opportunities or difficulties. But if the stability becomes too great, so great that the coherence of the plan no longer holds, then I cannot describe my action as reasonable: 'That was just a fantasy. ' The stability of a plan may not dispose each individual in the same way or to the same extent. We may hold different beliefs even as we cooperate. We possess different levels of sensitivity and competence that lead us to act differently even though we hold the same beliefs and plans. The plan does not predict action, but shapes the intentions that motivate action. I may not possess the competence to sustain the plan we share and so turn away or drop out. 14
Evaluating plans
How do we know when our plans work well or fail us? Bratman argues that plans need to meet two types of demands: consistency constraints and meansends coherence. We do not make a plan to take parallel routes on our journey to work. We must choose one or the other. Insisting that we take both is inconsistent with regard to constraints. 15 As for means, choosing air travel for a 10-mile commute is inconsistent and incoherent. It makes no sense. A plan need not spell out all means ahead of time, but it should include enough means to support the underlying intention, otherwise the plan becomes means-ends incoherent. (Plans that say little about how to turn policy into projects may be said to lack means-ends coherence.) Dewey argued that we can also reconsider ends if the means entail unacceptable consequences. He envisioned the relationship as a means-ends continuum. For instance, supporters of home ownership for all Americans learn about implementation costs using current housing industry and market practices and revise the goal downwards to 65 percent (Blanco, 1994) .
These two demands reflect a pragmatic orientation. You cannot coordinate and control future conduct if your plans are not consistent with constraints (realistic) or means-ends coherent. Bratman points out that we use these tests to distinguish desires from plans. Our fantasies or utopias (which are
unconstrained by reality and do not worry about how ends follow from means) do not qualify as plans informing our intentions. When we intend to do something, we place this intention within our planning framework and the intention is subject to the demands of consistency with constraints and means-ends coherence (Bratman, 1987: 32) . 16 Prior plans establish standards of relevance for future deliberation. The constraints of consistency with constraints and means-ends coherence provide a 'filter of admissibility' for the review of options. Prior plans channel future deliberations in effect narrowing the scope of which options we need to consider in coordinating our conduct. This filter provides a framework 'to help determine which options are considered in the process of weighing conflicting reasons for action, rather than to provide reasons to be weighed in favor of one considered alternative over another. The reasons to be weighed in deliberation remain desire-belief reasons' (p. 34). Intentions shape practical reasoning by framing options based on the consistency and coherence of prior plans. 17 Bratman provides a way to reconsider a very basic distinction between goals and objectives or purpose and policy. We often imagine that the meaning of the planning effort flows downward from goal to policy. But reasoning practically uses planning to move in the other direction. We learn to articulate and clarify our purpose as we form a plan. How we do science and present our scientific findings differ, and so does planning conduct and plan presentation. We put the fully articulated goals at the beginning of a finished plan, but these goals did not appear so vivid and complete at the outset of the planning process. 18
Planning makes practical reasoning work
Once we recognize planning as a crucial ingredient for practical coordination, then we no longer need to find a theoretical rationale for planning. We need not search out some foundation for planning, some deeper or wider source of justification beyond the practical coordination we do every day. When analysts argue that planning need apply the rules and conventions of rationality used in the sciences they are not providing a foundation or justification for planning, but trying to squeeze a practical and robust planning activity into a too specialized theoretical framework. Bratman's work helps us recognize that planning analysts need worry less about finding a theoretical rationale for planning, and consider instead how plans shape different kinds of rational decisions.
The focus of planning theory can shift from a justification for planning to exploring rationales for the scope and relevance of planning for rationality. How do we make plans that improve the rational coordination of the purposes of many people who do not know one another? How do we make plans that improve the rational assessment and inclusion of a variety of desires, purposes and beliefs held by many different groups of people? Rationality is not something we need to make sure we possess before we plan, but a practical accomplishment that may help or hinder the plans we make. How do we take the wisdom of the practical deliberations we use to make plans and use it to provide rational plans for more complex relationships?
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Bridging big differences in current theory
Some critics complain that planning theorists who focus on ideas about planning deliberation and intention have little useful to say about plans and the institutions and communities that together make up the subject matter for these plans (Mazza, 2002; Neumann, 1998 Neumann, , 2005 . Studying deliberation, negotiation, mediation and the details of disputes and conversation does not tell us enough about the role of institutions, organizations, communities and those larger structural relationships that together shape the problematic contours of complex urban regions. The focus on action misses larger and more encompassing institutional and structural features (Huxley and Yiftachel, 2000) .
The critics presume that we can understand how to anticipate and cope with the complex urban system by understanding an encompassing structural order. Recent scholarship on complex systems argues that the urban systems do not lend themselves to deductive logic and the metaphor of a stable edifice on a firm foundation. Emergence at the edge of chaos relies upon self-organizing interaction among the elements that compose the system; interaction that may change scope and shape across scale and that requires enough coherence to maintain resilience (Briassoulis, 2004; Daneke, 2001; Lansing, 2003; Lewin, 1999) . Sociologist C. Wright Mills (1959) understood this when he criticized sociologists who had adopted a too rigid version of structural functionalism and urged them to adopt the sociological imagination; inquiry that conceives social reality at the intersection of individual action and social context. When planning analysts select stakeholders for an interview or participation in a consensus-building collaboration, they make their selection attending to institutional and organizational context. The metaphor denotes that each participant brings to the deliberation an interest in an institutional or organizational sponsor. Additionally, the selection anticipates that the interests of these institutions and organizations will be shaped by the outcomes of the consensusbuilding. Small 'p' planning anticipates and draws upon large 'P' planning.
I want to argue that the difference in scale matters, but less for theoretical reasons than for more practical reasons of method and politics. I will compare two very different theoretical arguments about making plans: Lew Hopkins (2000) on making plans to represent future urban development and Judith Innes (1995b; Booher, 1999a, 1999b ) on consensus-building in planmaking. Despite very different conceptions about plan-making, I want to argue that, once we let go the search for a rational planning theory, we can find complementary use for both ideas.
Plans and representation
Hopkins identifies the use of plans in complex decision-making settings shaped by one or more of the following conditions: interdependence, irreversibility, indivisibility and uncertainty. He notes that these aspects of complex urban development violate the conditions necessary for a 'self-regulating' marketnot the conditions underlying actual complex markets, but markets tied to the ideal of equilibrium. We make plans to identify and describe relationships Hoch Making plans 23 among future actions that we can use to guide current decisions in the face of these complex conditions. Plans provide a tool we can use to inform a 'selforganizing' systemic response to urban complexity. 19 If we conceive of cities as complex systems in this fashion we can distinguish between those aspects of urban organization susceptible to adaptable change and those that are not. Table 1 analyzes Hopkins's urban complexity conditions by cross-tabulating urban system adaptability with conditions of time and space. The orientation includes the paradoxical tension between local behavior tied to unique ecological places and the cumulative interactive effects of such behavior within geographic communities and across communities and sectors within societies. When we organize the distribution of urban goods that possess one or more of these characteristics, then we need to use plans to consider how to inform decisions about their distribution.
Using this framework helps us consider the strategic emphasis of the plans we make in response to these complexity conditions. Facing indivisible or irreversible features of the urban system our plans offer strategies for accommodating to the inflexible aspects of space and time. Facing interdependent and uncertain aspects, we offer strategies for assimilating the future to the past; the global to the local. First, urban systems consist of interdependent dynamic relationships. What lenders, investors, builders and consumers will do in future urban housing markets depends not only on market signals, but on a variety of relationships including combinations of expectations, actions, responses and counter-responses. Second, urban system elements and relationships often prove indivisible and so unsusceptible to marginal adjustment. The roadway, the park, the plaza and many urban spaces only generate value and use as a whole and not in part. Third, many urban system relationships are irreversible. The sewer line, public works depot, police station, highway and stadium for instance, generate substantial contextual inertia. Fourth, urban systems remain uncertain because the people and institutions making the system change both their expectations and actions in response to one another. The future may become less uncertain if we agree to coordinate our expectations and actions (Hopkins, 2000) .
Hopkins studies the systemic dimensions as 'logical' elements of strategic selection by the planners and the plan; but does not include the phenomenological or rhetorical dimensions as part of the work of representation. His work emphasizes the analytical dimensions of plan-making; the representation of parts and an order that relates them; but he does not include the features of intentionality that animate the framing, evaluation and selection that make the fit between parts and whole work as a meaningful strategy of choice. The temporal includes memory/history/precedent and not just sequence/ chronology/order, while the spatial includes orientation/place/reference as well as scale/location/pattern. So when we make a plan we do more than anticipate and describe the logical order among future urban relationships, we assign value and meaning to these relationships as well.
Hopkins describes how plans work within this synthetic context in order to explain their causal efficacy. But the sense of causality here draws upon a more robust set of meanings. He identifies five ways that plans work: as agendas, policies, visions, designs and strategies. He takes a distinctly pragmatic approach when he insists that these are not classification categories for plans, but planning tools that we recognize and label based on the kind of effects they produce. He wants to explain how the use of each tool generates the effects we have learned to associate with its use. (Causes include the beliefs and behaviors that the users for each tool take for granted when they reach into their tool kit and select it for use.) Agendas and policies order priorities, while visions, designs and strategies offer different representations of future interdependencies. Design plans describe the future linking specific outcomes to changes in select relationships, while strategies focus on the recursive features of future changes simulating interaction effects among relevant options. Hopkins recognizes the plurality and pragmatic features of plans, but focuses only on the logical qualities.
Hopkins believes that the rational model (Black, 1990; Meyerson and Banfield, 1955 ) provides a standard for plan-making rather than a description. Ironically, he argues that the communicative rationality proposed by Forester (1999) and Innes (1996 Innes ( , 1998 parallels and reinforces the standards proposed by the rational model. Hopkins can do this, I think, because plan-making for him is mainly a cognitive activity rather than a social activity. Furthermore, unfamiliar with the distinctions used to analyze the relationship between plans and intention in practical reason, he miscasts the work by these analysts using practical reason as followers of the rational model. Hopkins, who astutely notes the crucial roles plans play in addressing the inescapable complexity of interdependence of urban development, still believes that plan-making represents logical information about future relationships and does not include intentions. He misses the fact that the communicative approach does not envision the situation from the viewpoint of rational standards, but starts instead with the prospects for improving the quality of practical plans among stakeholders by changing the social quality of learning that stakeholders use to coordinate with one another. Plans are tools we use to build joint intentions.
Plan-making combines logic and rhetoric. The plan selectively describes features of urban complexity that help a specific audience understand how to anticipate and respond to future changes within a specific urban system. Hopkins argues that plans offer information for strategic reflection, but this distinction ignores the insight that Bratman argues that we acquire conducting small 'p' plans. We learn early on to use plans to make good on joint intentions. So when we formulate big 'P' plans to coordinate activity in the context of interdependent action among several institutions pursuing diverse goals, we do more than order and represent information. We shape our intentions. As Innes, Forester and others make clear, communicating plan information involves political judgment as well as technical savvy. I turn next to some of the planmaking ideas proposed by Innes to show how we might combine Hopkins's logic with the rhetoric of intentionality to enhance both insights about urban complexity and plan-making.
Intentionality and making plans
Innes relies upon practical reason in her study of planning. For instance, her analysis describes information as active judgment rather than passive reflection. Human intention combined with cognitive assessment turns data into meaningful description. In her early research, Innes studied how different kinds of institutional convention and belief shape the intentions people use to create information even with the same cognitive tools (de Neufville, 1986; Innes, 1998) .
Innes (de Neufville, 1986) describes her research on the use of human rights reports adopted by the Carter administration, which became an institutional practice persisting even in the face of opposition by the staff appointed by the conservative Reagan administration. She attributes three kinds of consequences to this practice. First, the State Department had to prepare staff to conduct investigations and make reports on human rights. This meant that the career staff learned about rights and their reports enhanced the knowledge about rights in different countries. Second, the collection and publication of rights information invited comparison with other national conditions such as defense, taxation, economic conditions and the like. The publicity associated with such comparison shifted the terms of political accountability. Third, the practice of collecting and attending to human rights eventually changed the conventions of the State Department. Human rights became part of the policy lexicon used to routinely assess relationships with ally, neutral and enemy nations. Innes's account of information describes how policy analysts changed the practice of the State Department that over time institutionalized the evaluation of human rights as part of routine countrywide evaluations. How would such change work when making comprehensive urban plans?
The scale of a plan includes not only the representation of length of time and spatial scope for a particular place (see Table 1 ), but the audience for whom the plan is relevant. The features in Table 2 describes (1996, 1999b ). When we make practical plans for a complex city in a democratic setting we need to anticipate features of coordination that enable those for whom the plan is made or whom the plan may affect -the audience -to interpret how the coordination the plan describes will work across scale including what might be done to make such coordination effective. As we move across scale, deliberation at the group scale gives way to the reciprocity of community membership and the thin ties of publicity needed to bind the network society together (Bohman, 1996; Innes and Booher, 1999b; Mandelbaum, 2000) . 20 When planners make urban plans they expand the scope of coordination across scale. Individual choice of travel mode has a tiny effect on the metropolitan transport system. The cumulative effect of individual travel mode choices among residential neighbors has interactive effects for local congestion. The interactive effects across neighborhoods and within transport sectors generate congestion at different nodes across the entire metropolitan region. The plan can tell members of the audience how their choice contributes to system-wide congestion and how these metropolitan congestion nodes in turn shape individual expectations for the future. This representation encompasses what Hopkins describes as the logic of plans; the ordered relationships among complex activities from the viewpoint of their anticipated effects.
But urban plans also include the intentional features of selection and emphasis that reflect both the institutional conventions shaping urban system elements and relations (e.g. beliefs about importance of cars and perceptions of travel) and the beliefs of the plan-makers (e.g. beliefs about efficiency and sustainability). Making a plan uses these beliefs but, as Innes and others argue, these beliefs can be changed by the kind of process used to make the plan (1999a). An article by Wilson et al. (2003) illustrates how consensus-building deliberation can make plans. The authors describe how a BART transit station plan was changed during consensus-building deliberations among regional planning board members. The conceptual shift from a parking to an access plan changed both information and intention. Information expanded to include other transportation modes and their interaction effects, but also shifted the frame of reference to include the interests of other stakeholders. The more abstract terminology increased the complexity and scope of the planning context; improving the quality of the representation by moving away from a narrow focus on parking (e.g. linear assessment of demand and capacity) to access (e.g. the complex interaction among travel mode use at stations), while expanding deliberations to include the interests of other station-users whose expectations became a legitimate part of the plan. Most recently, Innes and Gruber (2005) linked planning styles with social complexity to classify planning activity among a diverse assortment of regional transportation planning participants in the San Francisco Bay Area. The technocratic arguments proved convincing when goals were simple and independent. Political positions coopted opposition where multiple interests struggled over a single issue. Proposals sensitive to social differences found converts where issues were complex and goals clear. Collaboration fostered mutual learning and co-evolution as the mix of complex goals and interdependent interests came into play. Instead of matching planning style to context, many planners insisted on using the same style without regard to changes in complexity, resulting in unnecessary conflict.
As we make plans we select how we respond to the complexity of urban development seeking, exploring and imposing order that translates our own intentions as authors into a more encompassing, even comprehensive account of the future. All plans are inherently partial and incomplete, yet when we make and follow them we anticipate completing a journey, connecting the parts or filling the emptiness. Hopkins's account emphasizes how we logically represent the complexity of urban development -a logic that includes pragmatic and not just formal relationships (e.g. consistency and coherence). This means that we attend to the consequences associated with different planning ideas. The consensus-building or collaborative approaches of Innes emphasize how rhetorical features frame the plans we make (1996, 1999a ). How we select and attend to the different plan representations in part depends on the interests and desires that animate our involvement and influence our judgment. The meaning of the plan includes how its assumptions, descriptions and proposals reflect and anticipate the expectations of those who made it, read it, interpret it and otherwise care about it. We face considerable challenges conducting this sort of planning as most institutions even in liberal societies have yet to adopt democratic practices allowing for this kind of practical intelligence. Additionally, there are serious problems designing and implementing these practices in ways able to handle the challenges of social coordination and complexity within and between organizations across scale (Sager, 2002) .
Practice: making plans and practical action
Professional planners have learned to make plans that adopt rational protocols: the belief that objective analysis offers valuable advice for an urban clientele (Hoch, 1994) . This belief has lost most of its persuasive power among planning scholars, but continues to justify and animate the professional, legal and political meaning of planning expertise and plans. Ironically, this belief generates an exaggerated distance and misleading antagonism between rational analysis and the kinds of practical judgments that politicians, public bureaucrats, organizers, planners and citizens make. Research by Forester (1989 Forester ( , 1992 , Healey (1997) , Innes (1995a Innes ( , 1999 , Throgmorton (1996) , and others has documented how this belief overlooks and distorts what people do when conducting public planning within different institutional settings. Planning support analysts have adopted a similar, if less deliberative approach, noting how form of representation shapes the meaning of urban plans (Brail and Klosterman, 2001 ). These scholars work hard to conceive how people might move beyond this unnecessary antagonism using scientific, political, ethical and other forms of knowledge to conduct more intelligent and practical planning. There is convergence around practice.
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Once we give up rationality as a standard for judging the plan and agree that process ideas do not help us make plans, how do we conceive of plan-making? I want to argue that we consider plan-making as a kind of practice. (Hopkins offers a series of distinctions to capture some of these ideas: behaviors, tasks, processes that we can judge using standards of rationality. For Hopkins planning remains essentially an activity of knowing.) A practice includes behaviors, but only as animated elements within an encompassing set of actions that people take. The pragmatic conception of a habit includes the recursive and tacit dimension of practice. But practice also refers to the competence of judgment acquired through interaction and experience. Innes offered an account of how policy analysts can change institutional practice, although she does not focus on plans as representations. 21 Paralleling the concept of institutional change we can focus on individual change and learning. We encounter a new problem or challenge, responding to it by using current habits or trying new forms of inquiry to generate coping actions. Habit maps onto institution and inquiry maps onto practice as we move up scale. So when we describe planning practice we do not mean what an individual does to form a habit (e.g. practice your GIS Charlie), but what individuals do within current planning conventions to shape the expectations of different planning audiences.
Planning practice can refer to specific kinds of behaviors undertaken within a specific institutional setting. We can tell a story about particular planning practice conducted by an individual. But planning practice also refers to the articulation of technical knowhow about practical actions that anticipates and prepares for the future. When planners make a plan they contribute to the practice of planning. This interpretation avoids casting plan-making as an exclusively cognitive and analytical activity separated from values, feelings, desires, attachments and all the qualities that shape human judgment. 22 This focus on practical reasoning also invites us to consider power relationships as part of planning judgment. Instead of having to treat power as antagonist to rational planning, we can envision power as an accompaniment to planning. The contest between power and rationality disappears as an issue for theoretical concern, replaced with more practical discussions about the kinds and consequences of different power relationships for a wide range of complex activities and purposes. As we study how power relationships shape planning activity, the contested features of the concept associated with its use become less categorical and more relational.
Conclusion
We make plans not to reduce complexity into predictable routine, but to anticipate, prepare for and cope with complexity in ways that better meet our needs, fulfill our purposes and respect our limitations. Plans combine instrumental inquiry with deliberation to form intentions that guide joint action and improve coordination. Hopkins and Innes offer very different accounts of how we can and should make plans in these settings. Deliberation invites participants to Hoch Making plans 29 persuade one another to adopt a modified version of the descriptions, analysis, programs and policies that compose a plan, and to inspire a willingness to treat these versions as a guide for the practical judgments used to put the plan elements into action (Hoch, 2002) . When we focus on planning theory using practical reason, we can leave aside the debates about rationality that have distracted us from considering the many ways we can make plans and the variety of effects these plans produce at different scales for different contexts. When analysts stopped thinking of instrumental or blueprint-type plans as part of a specific practical tradition tied to certain kinds of contexts and applications and imagined this instrumentalism as a method of rationality applicable to all kinds of contexts (e.g. the rational planning model), they created a severe handicap for those trying to justify planmaking (Neumann, 1998 (Neumann, , 2005 ). Bratman's analysis of practical reason argues that we make plans in the context of forming intentions; not when we formulate epistemological or ontological systems of belief. Hopkins and Innes already recognize the importance of this insight (although probably for different reasons than I have offered) and offer theory about how we make plans. Yet each illustrates an important yet incomplete aspect of the kind of practical reason we use: logic and rhetoric. Considered together their ideas prove more insightful and complementary than if judged independently. In this respect my work responds to Donaghy and Hopkins's (2006) recent effort to weave what they call an emergent web of plans:
It is possible and even fruitful to consider how forecasts might be useful in plans without simultaneously considering whether different cultural experiences will lead people to respond to forecasts differently or to focus on multicultural responses without considering relationships of forecasts and plans. It is even more fruitful, however, also to think about how these questions interact so as to think about whether asking both questions at once might matter. (Donaghy and Hopkins, 2006) Notes 1. I am avoiding a strong distinction between plan-making and planning. I believe the meaning varies with the context of use, but that making and doing plans retains enough common meaning to make the argument that follows coherent. See Verma (1998) on the importance of similarity in theoretical approach. 2. Rationality refers to how we use reason to guide choice and conduct. Rationale refers to the reasons we offer when responding to questions about the choices we make and our conduct. Deliberation refers to the inherently dialogical and social quality of both. How we choose and how we act on our choices are distinct but closely related issues. 3. Gerald Nadler distinguished between research inquiry and problem-solving or planning. We can conduct research through solitary reflection, but solving problems or making plans requires joint inquiry. See also Edna Ullmann-Margalit's (1999: 3-14) introductory remarks. 4. Laying out what might seem otherwise obvious is important because some believe that the preferences we form to guide our conduct express uniquely individual desires not touched by social cooperation, while others insist that planning relies upon an underlying rationality as a kind of foundation.
Planning Theory 6(1) 30 5. Studies of chimpanzees have uncovered highly developed social intelligence including theft, deception and cooperation; and evidence of the use of tools to collect termites and crack nuts. But there is no evidence that chimps can use tools to improve social activity or social learning to improve the use of tools (Mithen, 1999) . 6. Cass Sunstein describes this sort of adjustment as an incompletely theorized agreement. When people in groups (e.g. planning commission or committee) disagree about the meaning of an abstract value (e.g. equality versus liberty) they improve their understanding by conceptual descent. They move down levels of abstraction to a level where conceptual agreement becomes possible. People may believe in the protection of an endangered species but hold different reasons for this belief, such as ecological contribution or contribution to human life. We may agree that traffic is bad without agreeing on a rationale (Sunstein, 2000: 98-119 ). 7. Most of social life consists of habits for individuals, customs for communities and rules or laws for societies. The dynamics of planning change as we increase the scale of the social relationships and as we increase the temporal reach. 8.
Theories of rationality conceive of rational action as the employment of appropriate means for achieving a desired end. Rational action is thus thought of as a product of two vectors. One is the vector of belief, or knowledge, or probability. The other is the vector of desires, or wants, or utility. I act rationally when I act to promote what I want on the basis of what I know (Ullmann-Margalit, 1999: 73). 9. The 'classical model' of rationality portrays all action as ultimately "selfish" or "egoistic." It is assumed that even when acting altruistically, the agent maximizes some preference (such as the desire to please others, or to gain a reputation) that excludes, among other things, "strong altruism" (i.e., altruistic actions that are not motivated in the agent's desires) . . . . The "selfishness" of the classical model goes back to its assumption that only the agent's desires can function as reasons for action. Whatever she does, the agent has to have some desire that, given her beliefs, she expects to be optimized by her choice over the alternatives at hand . . . . Non-selfish behavior has roots that reach far deeper than language, right into pre-linguistic intentionality of a special sort: we-intention (Schmid, 2003: 78-85). 10. Analysts studying judgmental biases would say we are 'anchored' deeply in some of these beliefs. Reconsidering them may cause what Kurt Lewin called dissonance. Revising deeply held values rattles us too much! Thanks to Sanda Kaufman for this insight. 11. Plans accompany intentions in this sense across the full range of contexts. We can describe cases where people make intentions without plans, but then we describe them as impulsive and irrational. 12. Heuristic models for decision-making adopt this insight, for instance, when studying how 'consumers' with little time and money coordinate with others in learning about and choosing a product. Consumers mimic others not only to reduce transaction costs, but because we learn that if others like the product we will as well. Advertisers understand how we make plans and use this feature of human cognitive and social adaptation to shape our purchase intentions and choices. That we make judgments in such ways does not mean that we should do so. We can adopt clever forms of resistance. 13. Evidence from social psychological research on counterfactual thinking demonstrates that people do anticipate and prepare for future action. How people value plans depends on their conception of the future; a conception shaped by the plans they make (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993; Roese and Olson, 1995) .
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14. The idea of stability of commitment represents a virtue of sorts for individuals and an institutional or social property that proves especially rare. When the very survival of the institution requires the stability, then the plan will hold, but for more peripheral issues of taste, the change will be more frequent and plans will become obsolete. A complementary quality is flexibility and the more targeted notion of adaptability. Flexibility refers to a capacity for change that does not alter the integrity of the commitment, while adaptability refers to a capacity that denotes a flexibility that will alter the commitment to fit changing circumstances to produce improved consequences. 15. From this viewpoint we cannot say that we plan to provide affordable housing or adequate flood control without intending to carry it out. We would find it impossible to coordinate plans with others if they were not consistent in this way. 16. Preferences and interests may generate expectations that motivate action; but the expectations do not become intentional without a plan (Hendriks-Jensen, 1996) . 17. Local municipal planning in the US often occurs without paying attention to prior plans. The apparently imaginative and innovative posturing does not build upon how we use planning, but falsely imagines plans as an image of the future independent of current policies and activities. The idea of the comprehensive plan stumbles badly when it adopts a concept of rationality that relies on assumptions about the future not closely tied to local context, institutional practices and favored purposes. Bratman does not consider the various sources of cognitive and emotional bias that can clog the filter of admissibility. 18. Local plans that use the same goal statements as neighboring communities, thus skipping the time-consuming process of starting with the more detailed and prescriptive plans or policies linking purpose to context, not only lack relevance for those who might use them, but the goals may perversely distract or misguide people, inspiring disbelief or cynical acceptance with little practical regard. If elected officials can adopt a plan and then ignore it, the document failed to do planning. 19. Hopkins imagines plans informing strategies and designs within a democratic decision-making system. Plan-making does not directly draw upon this democratic process, but supplements and informs it. Hopkins conceives plan-making composed of behaviors organized into tasks tied together into a process subject to rational standards. He characterizes the ideas by Innes and other communicative action theorists as an effort to change rational standards into standards for communicative rationality. As a result, they have little to say about the details of plan-making behavior and tasks (Hopkins, 2000: 192-4) . 20. Healey et al. offer an alternative conception of such coordination drawing on levels of power that crosscut governance across scale shaping three kinds of institutional capacity: the coordination scheme presumes shared interdependence across scale and does not work well in settings where stakeholders can unilaterally avoid coordination with little or no cost (Healey et al., 2003: 60-87) . 21. I am using the concept in the manner described by Turner (1994) , for whom the concept of practice refers to '. . .the individual formations of habit that are the condition for the performances and emulations that make up life. No one is immured by these habits. They are, rather, the stepping-stones we use to get from one bit of mastery to another' (p. 123). 22. Todd Lekan (2003) describes the kind of learning we associate with practice distinguishing the knowhow we acquire as we turn specific skills into a practice, for instance, cooking or playing a musical instrument. We do not follow rules, but learn Planning Theory 6(1) 32 contextual competence. Second, the practice changes in response to innovations in expertise or changes in context; improvisation and adaptability generate novel problems and solutions. Last, conducting a practice cannot be done simply, but requires complex judgments and adjustments. Lekan describes such practice as networks of interdependent habits mediated by action plans that '. . . recontextualize conduct by framing a situation in terms of new possibilities' (Lekan, 2003: 33) .
